Speakers
She is a professor and University Research Chair at the Department of Philosophy of the VU Amsterdam. She is also a Professorial Fellow at Arché in St. Andrews (2019-2024). She is currently running the ERC Consolidator project 'The Social Epistemology of Argumentation' (2018-2023).
Her monograph The Dialogical Roots of Deduction won the 2022
Lakatos Award.
Argumentative Injustice Revisited
Prof. Catarina Dutilh Novaes (joint work with Solmu Anttila)
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
If argumentation has a strong epistemic component, then it makes sense to ask whether there are forms of epistemic injustice that arise specifically in connection with argumentation. Bondy (2010) was perhaps the first to introduce the term ‘argumentative injustice’, modeled after Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice. Since then, much has happened both in argumentation theory and in the literature on epistemic injustice, which suggests that the notion of argumentative injustice must be revisited. In this talk, I apply the three-tiered model of epistemic exchange that I’ve been developing in recent work (Dutilh Novaes, 2020) specifically to the issue of epistemic/argumentative injustice. I argue that injustices can occur at multiple levels: regarding who commands sufficient attention in an epistemic community, who is perceived as trustworthy in a community, and the differential engagements that different epistemic agents may receive in an argumentative situation. I also argue that some forms of epistemic/argumentative exclusion do not constitute an injustice.
She is a full Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM), where she holds the Canada Research Chair on Epistemic Injustice and Agency. She is also the co-founder of the Autistic Collective of UQAM (Collectif autiste de l’UQAM)
Her current research interests lie in feminist, social and political philosophy as well as philosophy of race, disability and neurodiversity.
A Pluralist Account of Epistemic Injustice and Agency
Prof. Amandine Catala
University of Quebec at Montreal, Canada
The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that stems from an implicitly logocentric conception of epistemic agency, which is based on a view of knowledge as propositional. I develop a broader, pluralist conception of epistemic agency, which relies on a conception of knowledge that accounts not only for propositional knowing, but also for other types of knowing that have been largely neglected in discussions of epistemic injustice and agency, yet that have significant implications for our understanding of both. I then show that this pluralist account, by expanding the scope of epistemic agency, has important consequences for which individuals qualify as epistemic agents and therefore as subjects of epistemic justice. Finally, I argue that this pluralist account of epistemic agency pushes us to revisit the current conception of epistemic injustice and to expand its taxonomy to include meta- epistemic injustice as well as non-propositional forms of epistemic injustice.
She is a philosophy lecturer at the University of Indonesia, Depok. Her research interests in the field of Philosophy include Environmental Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Existentialism. Saras has also written several articles in scientific journals and authored books such as Cinta Bukan Cokelat (2009) and Ekofenomenologi: Mengurai Disekuilibrium Relasi Manusia dengan Alam (2015).
Rethinking Knowledge Systems: Transdisciplinary Methods to Challenge Epistemic Discrepancy in Environmental Discourse
Dr. LG. Saraswati Putri
Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia
This study proposed an alternative perspective in dissecting the epistemic discrepancy that arises concerning environmental issues. The current knowledge structure isolates humans from their environment, fostering a continuous anthropocentric viewpoint that solidifies the prejudice of human dominion over nature. To counteract this structure, a transdisciplinary research approach is employed that incorporates local wisdom; ancient manuscripts, dances, textiles, and other artistic artifacts. This exploration utilizes the critical viewpoint of pendulum theory, elucidating that human consciousness perpetually oscillates between self, the collective, and the environment. This suggests that environmental issues should be invoked into a translocal multiplicity movement, positioning climate change as a shared factual reality of the citizen of the world.
He is an associate professor of philosophy at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He is currently the director of the Center for Pancasila Studies (PSP), UGM.
His recent publications includes Studies of Pancasila: Balancing Teleology and Deontology (2010) and Human Rights and Corruption: Indonesian Case of Reconciling Universalism and Relativism (2013).
Democracy and Epistemic Injustice: Assessing Rule by the Experts and Rule by the People
Agus Wahyudi, Ph.D.
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia
Democracy as a political system requires truth and must operate according to the standard of truth. However, in democracy, the truth of expertise and the truth of ordinary people (the folks) are often seen in sharp contrast, if not in contradiction. The article will examine the validity of the assumption of epistemic injustice from these two justifications of democratic government. The main argument I want to defend is that contradicting these two things must be corrected, as this would add to the unnecessary confusion of epistemic injustice. The epistemic injustice is a product of the involvement of demos, including experts and ordinary people (the folks). Therefore, all the results of thoughts and, at the same time, choices of action by experts and folks (ordinary people) can be the causes of epistemic injustice.